Introduction
Given the efforts over the past decade to refining the prudential regulation of banks all over the world it could be considered astonishing that the advanced economies find themselves in 2008 the midst of a wide-ranging banking and financial crisis.
Ironically, it seems that increasing over-reliance on sophisticated but mechanical riskmanagement models lured bankers and regulators alike into a false sense of security.
The shocking realization that these systems had failed to prevent serious losses resulted in a panicked reaction on the part of many market participants. Their revulsion has resulted in a protracted period of illiquidity in interbank and other shortterm money markets and generated a credit crunch. Thus, although crystallized fiscal costs of the crisis have so far been small, official lending to distressed institutions is growing rapidly likely entailing future costs and economic activity threatens to dip well below capacity for some time.
This paper begins by placing the present crisis in the context of historic experience; there are many commonalities, and some evident novelties, but the role of mechanical risk-modelling is seen as especially distinctive this time. Section 2 takes a look at the costs, distinguishing between direct private and public costs, and overall economic costs. Section 3 considers what messages can be learnt for prudential regulation. Section 4 concludes.
In order to draw the correct policy lessons, we need to understand the nature of the crisis. Recent commentary has tended to emphasize commonalities between what has been happening to the banking system in the past year with crises of the past. Classic accounts of previous crises have been dusted down.
If history explains all, how is it that the same errors were made, and in particular not detected and prevented by prudential regulation? After all, lessons were learnt from past experience and embodied in national policy structures. The US Savings and Loan debacle of the late 1980s, and the East Asian and Russian crises of 1997-8 led to a considerable effort to upgrade the policy and regulatory environment. This included the introduction of prompt corrective action in the US, adoption of the more sophisticated risk management tools of Basel 2, and the preparation of regular Financial Stability Reports by or for financial authorities in advanced and developing countries. 1 And banking has been conducted against a background of macroeconomic and monetary stability so exceptional that it has been dubbed the Great Moderation.
tures low
The background and evolution of the crisis has indeed exhibited a number of fea well-known from previous bank crises worldwide (Honohan, 1997; Caprio and Honohan, 2005 , Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008 historically risk premia (Shiller, 2005 relation between credit rating agencies and banks is another example of principalagent problems and also once again illustrated the risks associated with financial innovation. The use by banks of conduits and special investment vehicles to move parts of their asset portfolio off-balance sheet (thereby escaping some mechanical rules-based capital requirements) and financed with short-term borrowings is a fo of regulatory arbitrage and an example of the perennial desire of banks to make iven y over-optimistic enthusiasts to words of caution as a bank or a banking system r sary adjustments to large and deep-seated international acroeconomic imbalances this time too is aggravating the home-grown problems of nking isplaced confidence in the overall effectiveness of risk management techniques money from maturity transformation.
But crises differ in important details and even in the character of the main driving forces. That is why they recur. "This time it will be different" is the response g b moves into risky territory; and indeed it usually is, though not in a good way.
In particular, it is important to recognize that the banking problems that have now At the heart of the crisis, at least in its first year, were problems with complex s payments on primary loans, especially US relatively low grade residential mortgage
As discussed in greater detail below, many of the mortgage-backed securities have proved much less valuable than they seemed at issue. This was not just because o falling house prices, but also partly because the mortgages had been missold to people who couldn't afford to service them and partly because the propensity to default increased. But especially important was the extent to which the officially-authorized rating agencies used risk models to assign what proved to be overoptimistic ratings to these securities. Trusting the ratings, banks and other investors acquired these overrated securities in great volume. Alas, not only did the assigned ratings underestim the probability of loss (because of optimistic assumptions 3 fed into the risk models), but many of the top-rated securities, carefully structured to be compatible with a model-generated AAA rating, had built-in fragility. Even Banks are estimated to account for about half of these losses. This estimate has been criticized by the Bank of England (2008) for its important reliance on market prices of credit derivatives; the Bank of England argued that these markets were sufferin 4 Honohan (2002) distinguishes between three components of the cost of a banking crisis: (i) the stock component is the accumulated waste of economic resources (this would include the costs incurred by those to whom unaffordable mortgage were mis-sold); (ii) the public finance component of the true economic costs (which importantly is not the same as the fiscal bill); (iii) the flow component of the economic cost arising from the subsequent output slumps caused by the banking crisis. The quantifications discussed below: total banking losses, fiscal costs and the dip in economic activity can be thought of as crude approximations to these three components respectively.
from an asymmetric information bias (lemons effect) and did not provide a good approximation to an expected value of losses. Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) (CK). The median fiscal cost for these was 10.0 per cent of GDP (mean 14.3). Looking just at the crises deemed systemic by CK, the median cost was 13.1 (mean 16.8). Using these data, Honohan and Klingebiel (2003) showed that these costs were systematically higher the more accommodating and lenient was crisismanagement policy.
The number of cases can be augmented by mapping known data on the proportion of nonperforming loans (NPLs) at the time of official intervention to fiscal losses. By fitting a least squares regression between NPLs and losses for the countries for which both is available, we obtain a relationship that can be extrapolated to the counties for which only NPL data is available This was done for Honohan (1997) and is updated here. For the 93 countries in the augmented series the median fiscal cost is estimated at 13.2 per cent of GDP (mean 16.7);
confining ourselves to the 78 crises deemed "systemic" by CK lifts the median percentage to 15.5 (mean 19.1). (Table 1 The ability of banks to recapitalize is of central importance in determining the extent and depth of credit crunch. Greenlaw et al. (2008) stress the multiplier effect on credit (and thereby on GDP) of reductions in bank capital due to credit losses. There is some empirical evidence for this; bank capital is generally included as a control in bank-level modelling of changes in lending (cf. Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2008) . The links in this chain are not all immutable ones, though. Capital can be replenished, and there is some elasticity in leverage employed by banks and other financial intermediaries. Indeed, the recent study by Adrian and Shin (2008) showed the way in which investment banks can and do manage their portfolios very actively. When their risk appetite increases, they both build up their capital and their total assets, and vice versa. This proactive behaviour is quite unlike the generally passive asset management strategies followed by households, for which losses impacting their total assets and net equity position result in a negative correlation between changes in assets and in leverage. banks with the biggest reported credit losses to date; 15 of the 24 banks in Table 2 which shows reported credit losses by major banks since start of the crisis, are headquartered outside the US. suggests that perhaps a third of the total risk transferred was taken up in net terms by Asia, with
Europe also accumulating a modest new amount of additional risk, and the US a net shedder of risk through these mechanisms). Further detailed analysis of this aspect is contained in Beltran et al. (2008) , who judge that European banks were not disproportionately exposed to mortgage-backed securities relative to their holdings of other US obligations.
could not afford ("predatory lending"). This too we will not discuss further here in order to focus on solvency regulation.
What is noteworthy about the major losses surrounding the sub-prime debacle is the ome have suggested that the structure of the models used for risk management was he shortfall in mortgage servicing from this sub-prime lending should have been nd extent to which they have been associated with (i) the failure of mechanical riskmanagement tools and (ii) losses that were so far outside the projected range of possibilities that they imply modelling error.
S adequate but the distributional assumptions about shocks was too optimistic: tails not fat enough. In other words, just bad luck to be hit by a large exogenous shock.
T anticipated by the originators and by the arranger who acquired the stream of payments and structured them; it was not a random shock. 9 Some have rightly stressed the agency problems involved: in effect arguing that some originators a arrangers knew but did not care that they were selling on substandard products. In addition, though, the success of automated credit scoring systems in other contexts will have made it seem excusable to cut corners and not bother to exercise independent judgment in underwriting. Of course, the reality is quite the re statistical risk models are to yield usable guidance, they must be fed reliable inputs. A assumed correlations between the default rates of the underlying mortgage secur that were too low. 11 As such, it was relatively easy for ABS arrangers to construct AAA-rated (and hence low-yield) securities from high-yield mortgages that generated substantial surpluses to be distributed as fees (and income to the equity tranches).
The more the lower-than-actual correlations could be exploited in security construction (as with multi-layered securitizations such as Mezzanine CDOs and CDO-squareds), the more this modelling error was likely to result in sizable rating errors on the senior tranches. 12, 13 The global appetite for AAA-rated securities being high, this mechanism opened the door to a very large increase in tail risk, when losses occurred they would be more like falling off a cliff, than slipping down the a river bank.
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Here again agency problems arose. They related not only to internal remuneration incentives in the various firms involved, but also to the shared interest of arrangers 12 Ironically it may have been the tranches priced as least risky that may have experienced the worst net yields: the ("toxic waste") equity tranches could have received juicy rewards in some cases perhaps for long enough to make good returns (Ashcraft and Scheurmann, 2008) . Indeed, underestimating asset correlations in a securitized portfolio has the effect of lowering the likely losses on the equity tranche for any given average default rate (Belsham et al., 2005) Note, though, that some CDOs had additional protections for the senior tranches, such as default triggers giving the senior tranche investors the option to liquidate the collateral.
and the rating agencies in doing business even if it meant exaggeration of ratings.
And this is not the first batch of rated securitizations to suffer default rates well in excess of what their initial ratings would have suggested.
Another illustration of the vulnerability of mechanical risk management tools comes om the experience of UBS, a bank which has experienced one of the largest loanl ome igh-risk high-return strategies can thus allow other more hidden, opportunities for fr losses so far reported in the crisis. According to UBS's report to shareholders, one of the largest single sources of loss, accounting for more than a third of the bank's tota losses, were assets described by the safe-sounding term "Amplified Super Seniors" in which the risk of loss was initially hedged through the purchase of protection from an insurer. Because of their AAA rating and the hedge, these assets were regarded as very safe and exempt from risk scrutiny, allowing them to be accumulated in large quantities by the relevant desks of the bank. The proportion hedged was, however, unfortunately limited to the first 2-4 per cent of loss. 15 Because the insurance was only first-loss, and the volume of assets large, the bank was much more highly vulnerable to model error or large shocks than its risk managers recognized.
Complacent over-reliance on mechanical risk-management rules that shut-off s h leveraging risk. In the presence of moral hazard, this combination can even amplify overall risk. 15 The bank states that "this level of hedging was based on statistical analyses of historical price movements that indicated that such protection was sufficient to protect UBS from any losses on the position" (UBS, 2008, p. 14) . The level of hedging also seems to have been designed to meet internal risk-management rules (Hughes et al., 2008) The danger that even simple risk-management rules could actually amplify risk has een discussed in the literature for at least thirty years (cf. Kahane, 1977 . Principles need to be elevated relative to mechanical rules which can and always will be gamed. The more precise the mechanical rules, the easier to game a the more dangerous the games can become.
In practical terms, this perspective can be see Crisis database cost
